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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's Office (hereinafter "CCP A") appeals from a 
judgment of the District Court granting a public records request by the Respondent, Mr. Wade. 
The District Court determined that the records at issue, in custody of the CCP A pursuant to its 
agreement to serve as special prosecutor for Payette County in the matter, including reports, 
documents, and evidence collected and generated by the Idaho State Police, the Fruitland Police 
Department, and the Payette County Sheriff's Office (hereinafter "the investigatory records") 
were subject to a special release to a named party for purposes limited by the District Court. 
Because such conclusion is unsupported in law and could compromise potential enforcement 
proceedings, the CCP A appeals. 
B. FACTS & CASE PROCEEDINGS 
For the purposes of clarity and structure, the factual and procedural histories of this 
matter are incorporated below in a timeline fonnat. 
• December 22,2011: The Shooting! 
On December 22, 201] , the Idaho State Police (hereinafter 
"ISP") received a call regarding an officer involved shooting in New Plymouth, Idaho and was 
asked to investigate. This initial phase of the criminal investigation centered on whether an 
offense took place when a Fruitland police officer allegedly shot Mr. Wade. 
I The factual background to the shooting is a generalized synopsis based on the Appellants' Memorandum in 
Support of its Motion to Alter or Amend. (R., pp. 63-65) 
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February 14,2012: Conflict of the case. 
The Payette County Prosecuting Attorney (hereinafter "PCP A"), after identifying a 
potential conflict of interest, requested that the CCP A review the matter for possible charges as a 
Special Prosecuting Attorney. (R., p. 24).2 In accordance with common Idaho practice, the 
CCPA accepted the request to act as a reviewing Special Prosecutor.3 
• Between February 14 and March 15,2012: Initial prosecutorial review by CCPA. 
During this time, the case was sent over to the CCP A and an initial review took place. 
For approximately one month, the CCPA's Chief Criminal Deputy began preliminary review of 
the voluminous file. (R., p. 49).4 
• March 13,2012: Wade files a public records request through counsel on ISP. 
Wade filed his first public records request upon ISP. (R., p. 13-14). CCPA was 
contemporaneously not notified of the request. 
• March 15,2012: ISP denies Wade's request and suggests that he contact PCPA. 
2 Note that duly appointed special prosecutors have the same power as the jurisdiction's elected prosecutor to file 
charges, lesser charges, andlor decline prosecution against a defendant. See State v. Bacon, 1990, 117 Idaho 679, 
791 P.2d 429 (1990). 
3 I.e. §31-2603 sets forth the requirements for the appointment of a special prosecutor. A case being sent for review 
is not filed with the court and as a result there is no companion court pleading filed. The statute, I.C. § 31-2603, 
allowing appointment by a district court of a special prosecutor to assist in State's case against particular defendant, 
permits special prosecutor to assist in all related proceedings (including charging decisions and additional 
investigation). State v. Bacon, 117 Idaho 679, 791 P.2d 429 (1990). Typically, when a case is being handled by a 
special prosecutor, a petition from the requesting Prosecuting Attorney, along with a signed order from a District 
Judge, is filed. Oftentimes, when cases are sent to a prosecuting attorney's office for review, the request is done 
through formal letters, emails, or even a phone call. If charges are deemed appropriate, the agency that reviewed 
the reports will apprise the conflicting agency and at that time the paper work is initiated. 
4 I.C. § 31-2604 outlines the duties of the prosecuting attorney. That statute sets forth in part: 
It is the duty of the prosecuting attorney: 
2. To prosecute all felony criminal actions, irrespective of whom the arresting officer is; ... ; 12 
conduct preliminary criminal examinations which may be had before magistrates; ... (Emphasis 
added.) 
It is common practice of prosecutors throughout the State of Idaho to employ their own investigators as well as 
request additional investigation to assist in their charging decision andlor their eventual prosecution. See Rowles v. 
Country Kitchen Intern., Inc., 99 Idaho 259, 261,580 P.2d 862,864 (1978) (deputy prosecuting attorney prior to the 
preparation of the criminal complaint requested an investigation to be made by the office of the prosecuting attorney 
with assistance of three police officers). 
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ISP denied Wade's request explaining that "investigation is pending or ongoing" and that 
Mr. Wade could contact PCPA. (R., p. 16). 
• March 15,2012: First request by CCPA was made for additional investigation. 
Upon initial review of the case, CCP A independently determined that additional 
investigation was needed in order to make a sound charging decision. 5 (R., pp. 48-49). CCP A 
assigned its investigative division to conduct follow-up investigations as directed by the Chief 
Criminal Deputy. (R., p. 49). 
• March 22, 2012: Wade files a public records request through counsel on PCP A and 
is denied said records. 
Wade filed a public records request upon PCPA for copies of the police reports. (R., pp. 
19-20). The same day, PCPA declined Wade's request, advising him that the case has been 
conflicted to CCP A. (R., p. 23). Further, in PCPA's response to Wade, the prosecuting attorney 
indicated that "since Canyon County is still reviewing the decision, additional evidence may be 
sought by Canyon County and/or additional interviews requested." (R., p. 23). (Emphasis 
added.). The bases for PCPA's declination, as expressed by their letter, was: (1) that PCPA does 
not possess the documents requested, and (2) "The Payette County Sheriffs Office documents 
are exempt from disclosure at this time pursuant to Idaho Code Section 9-335(1)(1) and (e)." (R. 
p.23) The CCPA was not contemporaneously made aware of the request and denial. 
5 It is common practice of prosecutors throughout the State of Idaho to employ their own investigators as well as 
request additional investigation to assist in their charging decision and/or their eventual prosecution. See Rowles v. 
Country Kitchen Intern., Inc., 99 Idaho 259, 261,580 P.2d 862,864 (1978) (deputy prosecuting attorney prior to the 
preparation of the criminal complaint requested an investigation to be made by the office of the prosecuting attorney 
with assistance of three police officers); Clark v. Meehl, 98 Idaho 641, 643, 570 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1977) (Idaho 
Supreme Court acknowledges the Attorney General's Office may utilize an investigator to commence a criminal 
proceedin g). 
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• March 22, 2012: Wade files a public records request through counsel upon CCPA. 
Wade filed a public records request upon the CCPA requesting the "complete 
investigation, to include all reports, and all documentary evidence ... " relating to the ISP 
investigation. (R., pp 27-28). The request was processed according to CCPA internal protocol, 
without reference to or knowledge of the circumstances involved in the case or other agency 
involvement. 
• March 29, 2012: Discussion takes place between investigators and prosecutor. 
CCP A investigators met with the Chief Criminal Deputy to discuss the case and their 
follow-up investigation. It was determined that a secondary investigative review should be 
conducted by an independent reviewer. 
• March 30, 2012: CCPA denies Wade's request citing Idaho Code § 9-335. 
The CCPA denied Wade's public records request pursuant to Idaho Code (hereinafter 
"I.C.") § 9-335, because "disclosure of the same would interfere with enforcement proceedings 
and could deprive the parties of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication. (R., pp. 35-36) 
• April 1, 2012: Second Request by CCPA is made for additional 
review/investigation. 
Following up on the CCPA's March 29, 2012 discussion, it was determined that 
additional perspective and review by Canyon County Sheriffs Office's Chief Deputy (who was 
previously employed by the Idaho AG's Office as an investigator) would be beneficial to 
CCPA's assessment of the case. (R., p. 49). 
• April 9, 2012: Prosecutorial review by prosecutors continue. 
CCSO's Chief Deputy provided CCPA's Chief Criminal Deputy with the result of its 
independent review/investigation. (R., pp. 60). The CCPA Chief Criminal Deputy thereafter 
CORRECTED APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
WADE V. CANYON COUNTY 
DOCKET NO. 40142-2012 
Page 4 of 41 
gathered the file and the recommendations of his investigators and the insight of CCSO's Chief 
Deputy and continued his prosecutorial review of the case determining whether or not any 
additional investigation would be needed before making a charging decision. 
• April 19,2012: Wade filed a petition in District Court to access public records. 
In response to the petition, the CCP A filed an affidavit prepared by its Chief Criminal 
Deputy, averring that review was ongoing and additional investigation was not foreclosed (see 
Affidavit of Chief Criminal Deputy at R., p. 57). 
• May 4, 2012: District Court Hearing 1. 
Both parties involved presented oral arguments regarding their respective positions. 
Without reference to any authority, the court advised both sides that it would set the matter over 
for a two week period of time to see if the prosecutorial review for a charging decision could be 
completed. Of course, Idaho law provides five years for filing felony criminal chargcs, and one 
year for misdemeanor charges. 
• May 17,2012: District Court Hearing 2. 
The CCP A informed the court that it had not made a charging decision and that the 
records were not available because a charging decision had not been made yet. The Court 
ordered the CCP A files and documents be produced to it for in camera review to determine if the 
records should be excluded from disclosure under I.C. § 9-335. 
• June 5,2012: The District Court issues its decision. 
The court issued its memorandum decision and stated that the disclosure of the records 
would not interfere with the investigation, that the CCP A was "not justified" in refusing to 
disclose the records in an open case in which the Prosecuting Attorney's Office was reviewing 
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for criminal charges, and the release of the investigatory records would be beneficial to Wade if 
released in a limited fashion so he could file his notice of civil tort claim. 
• June 6, 2012: CCP A files its Motion to Reconsider with additional affidavits. 
(See R., p. 63). 
• June 29, 2012: Court reaffirms its June 5, 2012 decision. 
Upon a request by the CCP A for the District Court to alter its previous decision by 
providing additional information, the District Court modified its decision while reaffirming the 
grounds on which its previous decision was based. Importantly, the District Court limited such 
disclosure to Mr. Wade and his legal counsel for the filing of notice oftort claim. 
• July 11,2012: CCPA files its Notice of Appeal. 
The CCPA filed its notice of appeal against the District Court's June 29, 2012 Order 
Upon Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment compelling the production of public records which 
incorporates the District Court's June 5, 2012 Memorandum Decision. At this time, the CCPA's 
independent review of the potential criminal case remained ongoing. 
• July 20 2012: Rule 54(a) Judgment is entered. 
Following the Idaho Supreme Court's remand and order that the district court 
memorialize its determination in the form of an IAR 54(a) judgment, the district court ordered 
the disclosure of the requested records as noted in its June 29th decision. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED TO THE COURT 
A. Did the District Court En- by Ordering the Disclosure of Records of a Police 
Investigation of an Officer-Involved Shooting While Such Matter Was Being Reviewed 
by the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney? 
CORRECTED APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
WADE V. CANYON COUNTY 
DOCKET NO. 40142-2012 
Page 6 of 41 
B. What Standard of Review Should the Idaho Supreme Court Use When Reviewing 
the District Court's Decision? 
C. Should Wade be awarded attorneys' fees? 
III. STANDARDOFREVIEW 
The standard of review in an appeal regarding a question of law, including the 
interpretation of a statute, is one of free review. Ward v. Portneuf Medical Center, Inc., 150 
Idaho 501, 504, 248 P.3d 1236, 1239 (2011); see also Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho 
State Dep 't of Agric., 143 Idaho 366, 368, 146 P.3d 632, 634 (2006); Gibson v. Ada County, 138 
Idaho 787, 789, 69 P.3d 1048, 1050 (2002).6 This case centers on the question the district court 
misinterpreted I.C. § 9-335 and erred by determining the complete investigation of the shooting 
of Mr. Wade while pending prosecutorial review was subject to public disclosure under Idaho's 
public records law. This issue centers on a question of law. See Cowles Pub. Co. v. Kootenai 
County Bd. of County Com'rs, 144 Idaho 259, 262, 159 P.3d 896, 899 (2007). The issue before 
this court is whether the district court erred in its interpretation of the Idaho Public Records Act 
("PRA"), and thus, this court should make its reVIew de novo. 
As stated supra, this Court exercises free review of the trial court's decision on questions 
of law. Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 794. "This Court has free review over the construction 
of a statute, Waters Garbage v. Shoshone County, 138 Idaho 648, 650, 67 P.3d 1260, 1262 
(2003), which includes whether a statute provides for judicial review, and the standard of review 
to be applied if judicial review is available." Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 
6 When this Court considers an appeal from the denial of a public records request, it affirms a district court's 
findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous. Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792,794,53 P.3d 1211, 1213 
(2002) (citing DeChambeau v. Estate o/Smith, 132 Idaho 568,571,976 P.2d 922, 925 (1999)). "[F]indings ... based 
upon substantial and competent ... evidence will not be disturbed on appeal." Id. Gibson v. Ada County, 138 Idaho 
787,789,69 P.3d 1048, 1050 (2003). 
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Idaho 388, 400,111 P.3d 73,85 (2005). Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746,751,133 P.3d 
1211, 1216 (2006).7 
There is limited case law regarding the standard of review in Idaho public records cases. 
As stated above this court may look to the legislative history of the Freedom of Information Act 
5 U.S.C. 552 (hereinafter "FOIA") for guidance. Idaho Code § 9-335 mirrors exemption 5 
U.S.C. §552(b)(7). Under the FOIA, the district court must conduct a de novo review of the 
record. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). See also Barnard v. Department of Homeland Sec., 598 
F.Supp.2d 1, 7 (D.D.C.,2009). In 2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia provided a detailed analysis of the applicable standard of review for a FOIA case in 
AI-Fayed v. C.IA., 254 F.3d 300, 349 U.S.App. D.C. 223(C.A.D.C.,2001). The U.S. Court of 
Appeals concludes that: 
In the typical FOIA case concerning the withholding of requested documents, the 
appellate standard is rarely in doubt. In such cases, the district court normally has 
decided an issue, such as the applicability of a claimed FOIA exemption, on 
summary judgment, thereby reducing the question on appeal to whether there is a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding the exemption's applicability. Because the 
existence of a genuine issue of material fact is itself a question of law, we review 
such cases de novo. 
Id. at 308, 349 U.S.App.D.C. at 231. 
The Ninth Circuit has also affirmed this standard of review. In the Center for Biological 
Diversity v. Us. Dept. of Agriculture, 626 F .3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir.20 1 0), the court stated: 
In FOIA cases, we employ a two-step standard of review for summary judgment. 
Lion Raisins Inc. v. Us. Dep't of Agric., 354 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir.2004). 
First, the court reviews de novo whether an adequate factual basis exists to 
7 When this Court considers an appeal from the denial of a public records request, it affirms a district court's 
findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous. Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 794,53 P.3d 1211, 1213 
(2002) (citing DeChambeau v. Estate of Smith, 132 Idaho 568, 571, 976 P.2d 922, 925 (1999)). "[F]indings ... based 
upon substantial and competent .,. evidence will not be disturbed on appeal." Jd. Gibson v. Ada County, 138 Idaho 
787,789,69 P.3d 1048, 1050 (2003). 
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support the district court's decision. Id. Second, the court reviews the district 
court's conclusions of fact for clear error, while legal rulings, including its 
decision that a particular exemption applies, are reviewed de novo. Lane v. Deptt 
of Interior, 523 F.3d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir.2008). 
The issue before this court is whether the district court erred in its interpretation of the 
Idaho Public Records Act. As presented, this is a question of law subject to free review. The 
district court reasoned a law enforcement investigation is closed once it is provided to the 
prosecutor for screening. In the court's initial opinion, the court determined the case was closed 
and therefore required disclosure to the Petitioner. I.C. § 9-335(3) clearly sets forth that an 
"inactive investigatory record shall be disclosed unless the disclosure would violate the 
provisions of subsection (l)(a) through (f) of this code section." (Memorandum Decision). 
Implied in the ruling is the belief that I.C. § 9-335 only considers an investigation open until the 
police officers turn the investigation over to the prosecutor for review. Or put another way, that 
unless the prosecutor is taking reports, interviewing witnesses, essentially building a case, the 
investigation is inactive and the documents "shall" be disclosed absent an exception. This case 
centers upon a misinterpretation of law. See Cowles Pub. Co. v. Kootenai County Bd. of County 
Com'rs, 144 Idaho 259, 262, 159 P.3d 896, 899 (2007). The court erred by determining the 
complete investigation of the shooting of Mr. Wade while pending prosecutorial review is 
subject to disclosure under Idaho's public records law. 
Furthermore, the district court looked beyond the PRA creating a balancing test weighing 
the Petitioner's needs against the Respondent's need to exclude the records from disclosure. 
Unambiguously, I.C. § 9-338(5) states: 
The custodian shall make no inquiry of any person who requests a public record, 
except: (a) To verify the identity of the requester in accordance with section 9-
342, Idaho Code; or (b) To ensure that the requested record or information will 
not be used for purposes of a mailing or telephone list prohibited by section 9-
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348, Idaho Code, or as otherwise provided by law; or (c) As required for purposes 
of protecting personal infonnation from disclosure under chapter 2, title 49, Idaho 
Code, and federal law. 
The Court in its memorandum of decision, however, states, "[u]nder the facts known to 
the Petitioner at this time, he can effectively submit a tort claim; however, his ability to pursue 
this claim will be hindered unless given access to the requested documents." (Emphasis added.). 
(Memorandum Decision Pg. 2). It states, "disclosure of the requested records is limited to 
disclosure to the Petitioner and his legal counsel and may not be disclosed outside of the pending 
Tort Claim before Payette County or any subsequent civil litigation that may result from said tort 
claim." (Judgment, July 20, 2012). Limited disclosure of a document belies reliance on the PRA 
to justify the court's reasoning. A document is either public or it is not. An exception to the 
PRA applies or it does not. The carving out of an exception based upon need demonstrates a 
mistake of law. 
The Court's Judgment does not reference the PRA, and incorporates the reasoning in the 
Memorandum Decision. ("The Court's earlier Order is altered as follows .... ") (Judgment, July 
20, 2012). Respondent, and this Court, may reasonably therefore rely upon the court's 
statements in the Memorandum Decision as illustrative of its reasoning supporting the July 20, 
2012 order. The District Court's writings make clear the Court did what the statute prohibits; 
looked to the motives behind the request. 
I.C. § 9-338 is not the only section of the PRA that requires the reviewing agency and 
therefore the court to look no further than Petitioner's request. "The right to inspect and amend 
records pertaining to oneself does not include the right to review: [0 ]therwise exempt 
investigatory records of a public agency or independent public body corporate and politic if the 
investigation is ongoing." I.C. § 9-342(3)(a). The Court relies heavily on Petitioner's need to 
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justify deviating from the standards of the PRA. The court then moves on to a cursory though 
erroneous review of the PRA requirements for disclosure and exclusion. As stated supra, the 
court assumes the investigation closed and reads the act to require disclosure of the documents 
absent an exception. The court's memorandum and decision and the judgment fail to reference 
I.C. §§ 9-338 or 9-342. 
The District Court misapplied the law. The judgment attempts to make a distinction not 
provided by the PRA; the documents are not public, but based on Petitioner's stated need, the 
court would allow limited disclosure. The district court's misunderstanding requires disclosure 
once the police turn over their investigatory materials to the prosecuting attorney. The lower 
court's misinterpretation of the PRA requires unfettered review and clarification from this Court. 
Thus, this Court has free review of the lower court's ruling. 
Although the CCPA argues that this Court should freely review the lower court's 
decision, in the event this Court disagrees and instead reviews the lower court's decision under 
an abuse of discretion standard, the same arguments outlined below compel overruling the 
District Court. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. INVESTIGATORY RECORDS UNDER PROSECUTORIAL REVIEW 
ARE EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. 
1. State Statute and Case Law Make Investigatory Records Exempt 
From Disclosure When Under Prosecutorial Review. 
In Idaho, the public has a presumptive right to access public records, and exemptions are 
narrowly construed. I.C. § 9-338; Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 796 (2002), citing Federated 
Publications, Inc. v. Boise City, 128 Idaho 459,463 (1996). Although records are presumptively 
public, the Idaho Legislature has identified exceptions to this presumption. Of relevance to this 
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matter, I.C. § 9-335 exempts investigatory records from disclosure to the extent that one of six 
conditions is present. Specifically, I.C. § 9-335(1) states as follows: 
(1) Notwithstanding any statute or rule of court to the contrary, nothing in this 
chapter nor chapter 10, title 59, Idaho Code, shall be construed to require 
disclosure of investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes by a 
law enforcement agency, but such exemption from disclosure applies only to the 
extent that the production of such records would: 
(a) Interfere with enforcement proceedings; 
(b) Deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication; 
(c) Constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; 
(d) Disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a 
record compiled by a criminal law enforcement agency in the course 
of a criminal investigation, confidential information furnished only by 
the confidential source; 
(e) Disclose investigative techniques and procedures; or 
(f) Endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel. 
The statute also prohibits disclosure of inactive investigatory records if disclosure would 
result in one of the contemplated adverse consequences. I.C. § 9-335(3). 
a. Disclosure of investigatory records under prosecutorial review results 
in interference with enforcement proceedings, deprives parties of a 
right to a fair trial and an impartial adjudication. 
Although I.C. § 9-335 enumerates several different conditions, most of them address the 
integrity of the criminal investigation and enforcement process. The Idaho Attorney General 
("AG"), an expert prosecutorial agency, has specifically elaborated on the myriad of ways that 
disclosure would interfere with the investigative and prosecutorial process: 
.. .Interference with enforcement proceedings, as interpreted by the federal courts, 
includes prematurely revealing the government's case, thus enabling suspected 
violators to construct defenses in response thereto, Barney v. Internal Revenue 
Service, 618 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir.1980); Polynesian Cultural Center, Inc. v. 
National Labor Relations Board, 600 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir.1979); enabling litigants 
to discern the identity of prospective government witnesses, as well as 
confidential informants, or the nature of the government's evidence and 
strategy, Kanter v. Internal Revenue Service, 433 F.Supp. 812 (N.D.Ill.l977); and 
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exposing affiants and potential witnesses to intimidation or harassment, 
Polynesian Cultural Center, 600 F.2d at 1328. 
(Emphasis added.). (Wetzel, 1986 Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. 40 (1986)). Not only did the AG list 
numerous possible methods of "interference," the AG added that the list was not exhaustive. 
In this case, the CCP A determined that disclosure of the investigation reports would 
interfere with enforcement proceedings regarding the charging decision and litigation of any 
criminal matter. Among other considerations, the CCP A evaluated the same issues identified by 
the AG in Wetzel and concluded that the disclosure of the evidence could lead to tainting of the 
testimony of the witnesses and defendant should a charge be filed; would allow suspects to 
construct defenses well in advance of filing of charges and proceeding to trial; and that the 
exposure could lead to potential witness intimidation, as well as revelation of certain government 
strategies inherent to investigation and prosecution. 
Ensuring the parties the right to a fair trial and an impartial adjudication is an important 
function of the prosecuting attorney. "Every person accused of crime in Idaho has the right to a 
fair and impartial trial. It is the primary and fundamental duty of the prosecuting attorney and 
his assistants to see that an accused receives a fair trial." State v. Wilbanks, 95 Idaho 346, 353, 
509 P.2d 331, 338 (1973) (Emphasis added.); see also State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 251, 486 
P.2d 260 (1971); Pulver v. State, 93 Idaho 687, 691, 471 P.2d 74 (1970); State v. McKeehan, 91 
Idaho 808, 821, 430 P.2d 886 (1967); State v. Storms, 84 Idaho 372, 378, 372 P.2d 748 (1962). 
Premature disclosure, or disclosure prior to an independent charging decision rendered by 
an officer of the court in the exercise of certain constitutional and statutory authority, could result 
in deprivation of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication. In the Wetzel letter, the AG 
expansively construed the deprivation of fair trial. The AG explored the federal case law at the 
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time, and noted that "[t]he intent of this section is to insure that parties will not be prejudiced by 
premature release of infonnation concerning their case. Marathon Oil (DOE, November 22, 
1978) case no. DFA-0254; Gilmore Broadcasting Corp., FCC 78-845, FOIA control no.8-51, 
44 ADL.2d 886 (1978)." Wetzel, at 2. Disclosure before the charging decision could have ripple 
effects that may affect the charging decision itself. External pressures from the litigants, other 
agencies, and possibly the media could all be factors that improperly influence the investigation 
and adjudication. Hypothetical scenarios in which such deprivation would occur are easy to 
imagine, such as a confidential informant's name being released ahead of time, an abusive 
spouse learning that their significant other has contacted law enforcement, or a sexual predator 
learning that a case is being reviewed by a prosecutor for potential grand jury proceedings. 
The secrecy that shrouds grand jury proceedings is based on the same rationale as the 
exceptions contemplated by I.C. § 9-335. Grand jury indictments are often sealed and 
proceedings held outside of the public's knowledge to ensure that suspects are available and 
within the jurisdiction when criminal charges are pursued. Grand jurors are given stem warnings 
about ever revealing infonnation related to the cases they hear. See I.e. § 19-1112. All grand 
jurors must take an oath to secrecy,S and anyone who violates that oath is open to criminal 
liability. See I.C. §§ 19-1011 through 19-1012; Idaho Criminal Rule 6.3(b); see also In re 
Petition for Review of Hearing Comm. of Profl Conduct Bd. of Idaho State Bar, 140 Idaho 800, 
805, 102 P.3d 1119, 1124 (2004). 
8 The oath is as follows: 
You will keep your own counsel, and that of your fellows, and of the government, and will not, except 
when required in the due course of judicial proceedings, disclose the testimony of any witness examined 
before you, nor anything which you or any other grand juror may have said nor the manner in which you or 
any other grand juror may have voted in any matter before you. 
CORRECTED APPELLANTS' BRlEF 
WADE V. CANYON COUNTY 
DOCKET NO. 40142-2012 
Page 14 of 41 
Idaho judges go to great lengths to ensure that witnesses do not talk to each other during 
trial and that witnesses are excluded from hearings where testimony may be presented to ensure 
that testimony is not influenced. The premature disclosure of police reports, forensics, photos of 
the scene, officer's observations, and medical records all have the potential to affect the outcome 
of criminal proceedings. 
Disclosure of investigatory records in Mr. Wade's case would also lead to the deprivation 
of the right to fair trial and impartial adjudication. In every other area of the justice system, the 
courts have gone to great lengths to protect the integrity of a deliberate and reasoned 
investigative and prosecutorial process, such as in grand jury proceedings. When Mr. Wade's 
only prejudice, the need to file a notice of tort claim, is weighed against the protections of the 
integrity of a felony criminal investigation and the reputation and right to a fair trial of potential 
defendants and witnesses, the scales must tip strongly in favor of denying Mr. Wade's request. 
Withholding these reports does not prevent Mr. Wade from filing a notice of tort claim - in fact, 
he already has. Releasing these reports does, however, ring the bell of publicity for the possible 
defendant. The law recognizes this and provides protections to persons subject to investigation 
by carving out penalties for early disclosure and exceptions to the public records laws of Idaho. 
h. Disclosure of investigatory records under prosecutorial review 
constitutes an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 
Not all government documents and proceedings are readily accessible to the public. 
Although the bulk of governmental hearings are open to everyone, some proceedings are closed 
to those outside of the interested parties and attorneys. Involuntary mental commitment 
hearings, certain child protection cases, and some parental right termination hearings are not 
open to the pUblic. Jails and penitentiaries have sound public policy reasons to not share the 
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plans and diagrams of their buildings with the inmates housed therein. Governments naturally 
accumulate and maintain great stores of private information about people (i.e. tax information, 
social security information, and criminal history information). Because of the great amount of 
private infonnation that the government has about individuals, society expects the government to 
guard it closely.9 
Disclosure of information about criminal cases under reVIew for screemng at a 
prosecuting attorney's office could constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 
Individuals collaborating with the police may prefer not to have their identities released in a 
means other than criminal discovery. Individuals suspected of and investigated for a crime, yet 
not charged, are understandably sensitive about the disclosure of the police reports surrounding 
the allegations. For example, premature disclosure of investigatory records in pending sex 
offense cases could wreak a great deal of havoc. Requiring disclosure of these documents, 
irrespective of the charging decision, could stigmatize the suspect, even before a prosecutor has 
weighed the evidence of the case, determined if additional information was necessary, decided 
whether to file charges or not, and before a magistrate court or grand jury finds probable cause. 
Even if a prosecutor declines the charges, disclosure could permanently tarnish a suspect's 
reputation. Requiring disclosure of reports for criminal cases in screening effectively eradicates 
personal privacy in the realm of criminal prosecution. 
Because of all these concerns, disclosure of criminal cases while still in screening would 
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The idea that a perceived need to be 
able to fully litigate a potential tort claim at the time notice of such must be filed somehow 
9 See for example I.e. § 63-3076 discussing the penalty for divulging tax infonnation and I.e. § 9-340C dealing 
with personnel records, personal information, health records, and professional discipline. 
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defeats the public interest for a degree of protective secrecy in pending criminal matters seems 
antithetical to the efforts that the Idaho Code, the Idaho Criminal Rules, and Idaho case law go to 
protect those subject to investigation. 
c. Idaho case law shows that investigatory records under prosecutorial 
review are exempt from disclosure. 
The conditions for exception listed in I.C. § 9-335(1)(a)-(f) can arise throughout different 
stages of the criminal justice process. A case in the criminal justice system generally travels 
through four stages in which investigatory records are collected, gathered, and/or used. 1o "Stage 
One" is the law enforcement investigation stage. This stage is where police investigate, collect, 
and document evidence surrounding a criminal offense for review by a prosecutor. "Stage Two" 
is when law enforcement submits and/or presents their investigation to the prosecuting attorney's 
office, a separate law enforcement agency. The prosecuting attorney then reviews and screens 
the investigatory record to make a determination whether to prosecute the criminal actions 
(hereinafter "prosecutorial review"). See I.C. § 31-2604. During this time, the prosecuting 
attorney can seek further follow up investigationll to help assist in their charging decision. Id. 
That charging decision requires substantially more analysis than does completion of the police 
agency's preliminary phase of investigation. "Stage Three" is when the prosecuting attorney 
files criminal charge(s) against a defendant. The case then proceeds through the normal court 
process - arraignment to trial to appeal. "Stage Four" is when the case is sentenced, closed, 
10 These four stages are a general understanding of the traditional structure of the criminal justice system. The 
criminal justice system is a very convoluted and complex system and has been analyzed and constructed in 
numerous ways. These four stages are just one method of conceptualizing the system. 
II It is common practice of prosecutors throughout the State ofIdaho to employ their own investigators as well as 
request additional investigation to assist in their charging decision and/or their eventual prosecution. See Rowles v. 
Country Kitchen intern., inc., 99 Idaho 259, 261, 580 P.2d 862, 864 (1978) (deputy prosecuting attorney, prior to the 
preparation of the criminal complaint, requested an investigation to be made by the office of the prosecuting 
attorney with assistance of three police officers); Clark v. Meehl, 98 Idaho 641, 643, 570 P.2d l331, l333 (1977) 
(Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged that the Attorney General's Office utilized an investigator before commencing 
a criminal proceeding). 
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and/or declined for prosecution. If the prosecutor declines to file criminal charges, then the case 
skips directly from Stage Two to Stage Four. These stages are depicted in Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1: Four stages involving investigatory records 
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This Court has already determined that law enforcement agencIes can withhold 
investigatory records during an ongoing investigation, i.e. in Stage One. In Bolger v. Lance, the 
petitioner, Mr. Bolger, requested public records from the AG to see if the AG was conducting an 
investigation of him. 137 Idaho 792, 793-794, 53 P.3d 1211,1212-1213 (2002). At the time that 
Mr. Bolger requested the documents, the AG had not yet filed any charges. The AG refused the 
records request and turned the documents over to the court for an in camera review. On appeal, 
without laying out a specific analysis, the Idaho Supreme Court examined the documents, and 
determined that "the documents themselves were substantial and competent evidence to satisfy 
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the AG's burden of persuasion and to support the district court's finding that the withheld 
records were 'investigatory records,' under I.e. § 9-335(2)." Id. at 796. 
Although never explicitly addressing the issue, the Idaho Supreme Court has already 
suggested that investigatory records under prosecutorial review, i.e. in Stage Two, are exempt 
from disclosure. The case at question in the Bolger decision was arguably already under 
prosecutorial review. The AG apparently already had access to the investigatory records. 
Although the AG had possession of the records, it had not yet filed any charges. The decision 
does not explain further why or how the investigation originated. If the matter in question was 
still solely being investigated by police agencies, and not yet being reviewed for possible 
criminal charges, i.e. in Stage One, however, then the AG would not have had the records in the 
first place, at least not under typical circumstances. Therefore, the facts underlying the Bolger 
decision show that the Court has already held as exempt from disclosure investigatory records 
pending prosecutorial review. 
The disclosure of investigatory records while court proceedings are pending, i.e. in Stage 
Three, has not been as controversial. The AG explained that "[d]oeuments whose exemption is 
based solely upon possible 'interference with enforcement proceedings' are no longer exempt 
after completion of the actual or contemplated proceedings, provided no other exemptions apply 
at that time." Wetzel, 1986 Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. 40 (1986), at *4. In doing so, the AG 
suggested that concerns about certain consequences can subside once court proceedings are 
complete. 
However, sometimes investigatory records are exempt from disclosure even once the case 
IS closed, i.e. in Stage Four. In Gibson, the Ada County Sheriffs Department ("ACSD") 
discovered that one of their employees had been overpaid for eight months, and subsequently 
CORRECTED APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
WADE V. CANYON COUNTY 
DOCKET NO. 40142-2012 
Page 19 of 41 
terminated the employee. 138 Idaho at 788, 69 P.3d at 1049. The ACSD referred the matter 
over to the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney ("ACP A") for consideration of criminal charges. 
fd. Identifying a conflict, the ACP A then referred the matter to a special prosecutor. fd. After 
that, conflict counsel determined that criminal charges would not be appropriate. The terminated 
employee sent a public records request for the investigatory records at issue, and the ACP A 
denied the request. fd. After reviewing the documents in camera, the district court affirmed the 
ACP A's denial. fd. Based in part on the incomplete record on appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court 
upheld the district court's decision to affirm the ACPA's denial. Notably absent from the 
Court's decision was any discussion about the fact that the conflict counsel decided that criminal 
charges were not appropriate, therefore effectively closing the case. 
The AG has also suggested that the disclosure exemption can apply even to closed 
investigations. The AG elaborated on how disclosure of investigatory records from an inactive 
case could nonetheless result in consequences prohibited under I.C. § 9-335(1). Wetzel at *4. In 
noting that although the "interference" exemption may no longer apply upon completion of court 
proceedings, the AG stated the following: 
... [N]ot all exemptions lose their force immediately upon conclusion of the 
investigation. In some cases the potential for enforcement proceedings remains 
for some time. Pope, supra. In such cases an agency's closed files relating to 
enforcement proceedings may still be exempt from disclosure, provided such 
records are relevant to other cases and at least one of the six specified conditions 
for exemption exists. New England Medical Center Ho!,pital v. National Labor 
Relations Board, 548 F.2d 377 (1st Cir.1976). 
fd. The exemptions therefore can still operate to exempt disclosure of investigatory records, 
even after the completion of the investigation. 
Regardless of where a case is in the criminal justice system, the status of an investigation 
alone, whether active or inactive, is not necessarily dispositive on the disclosure decision when 
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any of the adverse consequences are applicable. Section 9-335 makes investigatory records an 
exempt category when the production would have any of the adverse effects listed in I.C. § 9-
335(1)(a)-(f), even if the investigatory record is inactive. See I.C. § 9-335(3). The Idaho 
Supreme Court and the Idaho Legislature have yet to articulate the definition of an "active" 
investigation in this context. No Idaho statute or case law attempts to define the line between an 
"active" and "inactive" investigation, even in cases dealing with possibly "inactive" 
investigations. For example, in the Gibson decision, the Court did not attempt to define whether 
an investigation was "active," "inactive," "open," or "closed." 
The records at question in Mr. Wade's case are under prosecutorial review, i.e. Stage 
Two, and thus are exempt from disclosure under the Bolger decision. Similar to the Bolger case, 
in which the AG already had the investigatory records, the conflict prosecutor's office had 
possession of the investigatory records. The CCPA was in a position that it could conduct 
follow-up investigation if it deemed necessary. Similar to the AG in Bolger, the CCPA could 
make a charging decision at any time based on whether it determined that it had sufficient 
evidence. 
To hold otherwise, and treat Stage Two differently than Stages One, Three, and Four, 
would lead to absurd results. Requiring disclosure of investigatory records in Stage Two would 
virtually create a small gap of time in between these stages in which these investigatory records 
are not exempt from disclosure. Such a gap could afIect law enforcement behavior. Effective 
and just criminal prosecution requires healthy and constant communication between prosecutors 
and law enforcement agencies. Instead of law enforcement interacting with prosecutors in 
building its cases, requiring disclosure would drive a rift between law enforcement and 
prosecutors. Law enforcement will build its cases independently of the prosecutor's offices, 
CORRECTED APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
WADE V. CANYON COUNTY 
DOCKET NO. 40142-2012 
Page 21 of 41 
because once the prosecutor has any of the records, the prosecutor could be compelled to 
disclose the records - even if, as here, only to serve a private interest in a perceived need to be 
able to fully litigate a potential tort claim at the time notice of such is filed. 
2. The Legislative History of the Idaho Public Records Act Shows the 
Legislative Intent For Investigatory Records Under Prosecutorial 
Review To Be Exempt From Disclosure. 
From the inception of the PRA, the Idaho Legislature intended as a general matter for 
police records to be exempt from disclosure. In the enacting legislation's statement of purpose, 
the Legislature discussed the law enforcement exemption prominently as follows: 
This proposal would exempt records of investigations, intelligence information, 
or security procedures of the Attorney General, the Department of Law 
Enforcement or local or state police agencies. Provided, however, is that local 
and state police agencies shall disclose information to persons involved in 
incidents, to authorized representatives thereof: or to insurance carriers against 
which claim has or might be made, or to any person who has suffered injury as a 
result of the incident. Further, however, disclosure is not required if disclosure 
would endanger a witness or the successful completion of a criminal 
investigation. 
Safety of persons, as well as the integrity of personal reputation which might 
otherwise be damaged by disclosure of mere allegations, is prevented by this 
necessary addition to the public records law. 
R.S. 12005 C3, 1986 House Statements of Purpose. The legislation said nothing about the status 
of investigations. Instead, the general purpose was to protect law enforcement investigatory 
records from disclosure. The factors contributing to this specific exemption were the protection 
of witnesses, of the integrity and impartiality of ongoing criminal investigations, and of personal 
reputations. 
Although the legislative history of the Idaho PRA alone is short, the legislative history of 
the federal FOIA provides much more context for understanding the Idaho PRA. The Idaho 
Legislature borrowed the statutory language from the FOIA in 1986, and has not made changes 
CORRECTED APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
WADE V. CANYON COUNTY 
DOCKET NO. 40142-2012 
Page 22 of41 
of much relevance to the instant matter since then. The intent behind the federal statutes that the 
Idaho Legislature took therefore provide useful guidance in understanding Idaho's own PRA. 
Proper judicial interpretation of the Idaho PRA requires analysis of the case law 
regarding FOIA, particularly between the years of 1974 and 1986. According to the AG in 
Wetzel, "[w]hen a statute is adopted from another jurisdiction it is presumed to be adopted with 
the prior construction placed upon it by the courts of such other jurisdiction." Wetzel, at * I; see 
also Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 659 P.2d 111 (1983). The prohibited adverse 
consequences from disclosure listed in I.C. § 9-335 originated from exemption seven of the 
FOIA, now codified as 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7). The AG therefore concluded that courts are to 
construe I.C. § 9-335 consistently with the FOIA. Wetzel, at * 1; see also Odenwalt v. Zaring, 
102 Idaho 1,624 P.2d 383, (1980); Marlin v. Lewallen, 276 U.S. 58,48 S.Ct. 248, 72 L.Ed. 464 
(1928). As discussed earlier, the federal statute, as amended in 1974 until its subsequent 
amendment in 1986, required that disclosure of investigatory records "would ... interfere with 
enforcement proceedings" as I.C. § 9-335 has always required. Mere potential interference was 
not sufficient. This version of the federal statute was the version from which the Idaho 
Legislature borrowed to enact I.C. § 9-335. Despite later changes to the federal statute, the Idaho 
statutes changed very little, thus making the federal case law on FOIA from 1974 to 1986 the 
most applicable to analyzing the Idaho PRA. 
The FOIA underwent several changes before arriving in the fonn that became Idaho's 
PRA. In 1946, the u.s. Congress created the Administrative Procedure Act which contained a 
short public infonnation section at 5 U.S.C. § 1002. The statute was very short and somewhat 
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vague, letting government agencies keep information confidential "for good cause shown.,,12 
The vagueness of the statute led to its expansive construction by government agencies, who used 
it to shield most of their records from public review. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
Freedom of Information Act Source Book: Legislative Materials, Cases, and Articles (Pub.L. 89-
487) Source Book, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 25-27, 47 (U.S. Government Printing Office 1974). In 
response, the U.S. Congress enacted S. 1160 in 1966. ld. at 40. This new 1966 version created 
the beginnings of the investigatory "exemption." 
The congressional intent in creating the investigatory exemption was to maintain the 
confidentiality of such reports, and to protect the government's case. In describing the 
investigatory exemption, Congress stated the following: 
Investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent 
available by law to a private party: This exemption covers investigatory files 
related to enforcement of all kinds of laws, labor and securities laws as well as 
criminal laws. This would include files prepared in connection with related 
Government litigation and adjudicative proceedings. S. 1160 is not intended to 
give a private party indirectly any earlier or greater access to investigatory files 
than he would have directly in such litigation or proceedings. 
(Emphasis added.). ld. at 32; see also Report of the House Committee on Government 
Operations, H.R.Report No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 11 (1966) (similarly explaining intent of 
not giving earlier or greater access to investigatory files). The Senate also articulated its 
reasoning behind the investigatory exemption: 
Exemption No.7 deals with "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement 
purposes." These are the files prepared by Government agencies to prosecute law 
12 5 U.S.C. § 1002 stated as follows: 
Except to the extent that there is involved (1) any function of the United States requiring secrecy in the 
public interest or (2) any matter relating solely to the internal management of an agency --
(c) Public Records. -Save as otherwise required by statute, matters of official record shall in accordance with 
published rule be made available to persons properly and directly concerned except information held confidential for 
good cause found. 
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violators. Tlteir disclosure of suclt files, except to tlte extent tltey are available 
by law to a private party, could harm the Government's case in court." 
Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Congress, 1 st Session, Report to 
accompany S. 1160, S.Rep.No.813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3, 9 (1965). The Senate also 
expressed its concerns about law enforcement files being improperly disclosed: 
It is also necessary for the very operation of our Government to allow it to keep 
confidential certain material, such as the investigatory files of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation. 
Id. at 3. In 1972, the Second Circuit described the legislative intent behind the investigative 
exemption as the following: 
These Reports indicate that Congress had a two-fold purpose in enacting the 
exemption for investigatory files: to prevent the premature disclosure of the 
results of an investigation so that the Government can present its strongest case in 
court, and to keep confidential the procedures by which the agency conducted its 
investigation and by which it has obtained information. Both these forms of 
confidentiality are necessary for effective law enforcement. 
~F'rankel v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 460 F.2d 813, 817 (2d Cir. 1972). 
In the 1974 FOIA amendments, Congress required that the investigatory exemption be 
applied more narrowly to the individual records themselves, not as a blanket exemption to 
everything contained in an investigatory file. See Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & 
Firearms, 789 F.2d 64, 65-66 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (discussing the legislative history behind 1974 
amendments). Citing Supreme Court decisions, at least one senator expressed concern that the 
courts were holding as exempt records that Congress did not intend to be exempt from 
disclosure. S.Rep.No.813, 89th Cong., 1 st Sess. (1965), reprinted in Freedom ofInformation Act 
Source Book, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice & Procedure, Senate judiciary 
Committee, S.Doc. No. 93-82, p. 333 (Committee Print 1974) (hereinafter "1974 Source Book"); 
see also NL.R.B. v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 98 S. Ct. 2311, 57 L. Ed. 2d 159 
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(1978) (where the Court provides an in-depth discussion regarding the legislative intent behind 
the 1974 amendments). Specifically, it was argued that "material cannot be and ought not be 
exempt merely because it can be categorized as an investigatory file compiled for law 
enforcement purposes." 1974 Source Book, at 333. In analyzing the legislative history for the 
1974 FOIA amendments, the Robbins Court concluded that "the thrust of congressional concern 
in its amendment of Exemption 7 was to make clear that the Exemption did not endlessly protect 
material simply because it was in an investigatory file." 437 U.S. at 230. The Court noted that 
the substitution of the word "investigatory records" instead of "investigatory files" signaled 
Congress' intent that courts must now: 
consider the nature of the particular document as to which exemption was 
claimed, in order to avoid the possibility of impermissible "commingling" by an 
agency's placing in an investigatory file material that did not legitimately have to 
be kept confidential. 
Jd. at 229-230. 
The legislative history from the 1974 amendments also provided some definition to the 
term "interference." The Attorney General's Memorandum on the 1974 Amendments stated as 
follows: 
Normally, clause (A) will apply only to investigatory records relating to law 
enforcement efforts which are still active or in prospect sometimes 
administratively characterized as records in an "open" investigatory file .... 
The meaning of "interfere" depends upon the particular facts .... One example of 
interference when litigation is pending or in prospect is harm to the Government's 
case through the premature release of information not possessed by known or 
potential adverse parties. 
S.Rep. No. 93-854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), Freedom of Information Act and Amendments 
of 1974 (P.L. 93-502) Source Book: Legislative History, Texts and Other Documents, 508, 517-
18 (1975); see also Title Guarantee Co. v. NL.R.B., 534 F.2d 484, 492 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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Despite these changes, Congress' concerns remained regarding premature disclosure of 
investigatory records. Senator Philip Hart explained that the new Exemption 7(A), the 
investigatory record exemption, was meant to apply: 
whenever the Government's case in court-a concrete prospective law enforcement 
proceeding-would be harmed by the premature release of evidence or information 
not in the possession of known or potential defendants. This would apply also 
where the agency could show that the disclosure of the information would 
substantially harm such proceedings by impeding any necessary investigation 
before the proceeding. 
1974 Source Book, at 333; see Campbell v. Dep't of Health & Human Services, 682 F.2d 256, 
262 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
The subsequent amendments to the analogous federal statutes indicate federal legislative 
intent to more broadly construe the investigatory record exemption. The Freedom of Information 
Reform Act of 1986, often referred to as the 1986 FOIA amendments, lessened the showing of 
harm required from a demonstration that release "would interfere with" to "could reasonably be 
expected to interfere with" enforcement proceedings.13,14 "The courts have recognized repeatedly 
that the change in the language for this exemption effectively broadened its protection.,,15 The 
13 Department of Justice, Guide to the Freedom of Information Act: Exemption 7(A). 
<http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_guide09/exemption7a.pdf>;citingPub.L.No. 99-570, § 1802, 100 Stat. 3207, 
3207-48; see Attomey General's Memorandum on the 1986 Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act 10 
(Dec. 1987) [hereinafter Attomey General's 1986 Amendments Memorandum). 
14 After explaining in 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) the types of records that must be disclosed, the federal statute analogous to 
I.C. § 9-335, 5 V.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7), now exempts as follows: 
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are-- ... (7) records or information compiled for law 
enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records 
or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) 
would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, ... 
(Emphasis added.). 
15 Department of Justice, Guide to the Freedom of Information Act: Exemption 7(A). 
<http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_guide09/exemption7a.pdf>;citingRobinsonv.DOJ.No.00-11182.slipop.at 8 
n.5 (l1th Cir. Mar. 15,2001) (noting that 1986 FOlA amendments changed standard from "would" interfere to 
"could reasonably be expected to" interfere); Manna v. DOJ, 51 F.3d 1158, 1164 n.5 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that 
Congress amended statute to "relax significantly the standard for demonstrating interference"); Alyeska Pipeline 
Servo V. EPA, 856 F.2d 309, 311 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (treating lower court's reliance on pre-amendment version of 
Exemption 7(A) as irrelevant as it simply "required EPA to meet a higher standard than FOlA now demands"); 
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federal statute analogous to I.C. § 9-335 has therefore morphed to include possible interference 
with enforcement proceedings. 
FOIA also made investigatory records of "secret" investigations completely exempt from 
disclosure. In 5 U.S.C. § 552(c)(1), Congress determined that when the subject of the 
investigatory records is not aware of the pendency of the investigation, then the records are not 
subject to FOIA at al1. 16 
The legislative history of these statutes provides evidence that Mr. Wade's request should 
be denied. From the statement of purpose of the Idaho PRA to the U.S. Congress' express intent 
not to give "any earlier or greater access" by virtue of the FOIA, the legislative history alone 
explains why denial of Mr. Wade's request is necessary to the public interest. Mr. Wade should 
not be getting access to these records any sooner by virtue of filing a public records act than by 
receiving discovery in his tort case - a point to which the legislative history clearly speaks. 
Although prosecutors cannot wholesale deny all requests for records merely because the records 
may be contained in an investigatory Ele, prosecutors can lawfully deny public records requests 
Wright v. OSHA, 822 F.2d 642, 647 (7th Cir. 1987) (explaining that amended language creates broad protection); 
Curran v. DOJ, 813 F.2d 473, 474 n.l (1st Cir. 1987) ("[T]he drift of the changes is to ease -- rather than to increase 
-- the government's burden in respect to Exemption 7(A)."); In De! of Animals v. HHS, No. 99-3024,2001 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 24975, at *9 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2001) (reiterating that "'could reasonably' ... represents a relaxed 
standard; before 1986, the government had to show that disclosure 'would' interfere with law enforcement"); Gould 
Inc. v. GSA, 688 F. Supp. 689, 703 n.33 (D.D.C. 1988) (The "1986 amendments relaxed the standard of 
demonstrating interference with enforcement proceedings."); see also Spannaus v. DOJ, 813 F.2d 1285, 1288 (4th 
Cir. 1987) (explaining that "agency's showing under the amended statute, which in part replaces 'would' with 'could 
reasonably be expected to,' is to be measured by a standard of reasonableness, which takes into account the 'lack of 
certainty in attempting to predict harm'" (quoting S. Rep. No. 98-221, at 24 (1983». 
16 5 U.S.c. § 552(c)(I) states as follows: 
Whenever a request is made which involves access to records described in subsection (b )(7)(A) 
and--
(A) the investigation or proceeding involves a possible violation of criminal law; and 
(B) there is reason to believe that (i) the subject of the investigation or proceeding is not 
aware of its pendency, and (ii) disclosure of the existence of the records could reasonably 
be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, 
the agency may, during only such time as that circumstance continues, treat the records as not 
subject to the requirements of this section. 
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for investigatory records pending prosecutorial reVIew when the prosecutor demonstrates 
potential interference with enforcement proceedings. Such disclosure would result in the harm 
contemplated by the United States Attorney General in the 1974 FOIA amendments, specifically, 
"harm to the Government's case through the premature release of information not possessed by 
known or potential adverse parties." S.Rep. No. 93-854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), Freedom of 
Information Act and Amendments of 1974 (P.L. 93-502) Source Book: Legislative History, 
Texts and Other Documents, 508, 517-18 (1975). 
3. Federal Case Law From Analogous FOIA Statute Suggests that 
Investigatory Records Under Review by Prosecutor Are Exempt 
From Disclosure, Regardless of Investigation Status. 
For investigatory records to be exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(A), the 
government must show generally how disclosure of each category type of record would interfere 
with enforcement proceedings. The court can make generic determinations that "with respect to 
particular kinds of enforcement proceedings, disclosure of particular kinds of investigatory 
records ... would generally 'interfere with enforcement proceedings.'" Robbins, 437 U.S. at 236, 
98 S.Ct. at 2324; see Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 789 F.2d 64,67 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986). "Because generic determinations are permitted, the government need not justify its 
withholdings document-by-document; it may instead do so category-of-document by category-
of-document. The government may not, however, make its justifications file-by-file." Crooker, 
789 F.2d at 67. 
The investigatory exemption does not automatically provide a "blanket" exemption for 
investigatory records. Campbell v. Dep'/ of Health & Human Services, 682 F.2d 256, 259, 261 
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Crooker, 789 F.2d at 65; see also Robbins, 437 U.S. 214, 223-24, 98 S.Ct. 
2311,2317-18,57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978). FOIA does not provide for a blanket exemption - an 
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exemption claimed for all records in a file simply because they are in the file. Crooker, 789 F.2d 
at 66, citing Robbins, 682 F.2d at 263. The government's description of the categories must 
allow the court "to trace a rational link between the nature of the document and the alleged likely 
interference." Crooker, 789 F.2d at 67.17 Under Robbins: 
the agency need only show that release of the particular kinds of records a 
requester seeks would interfere with an actual or contemplated enforcement 
action. At the same time, that decision does not authorize an agency to refuse to 
disclose any record compiled in anticipation of enforcement action merely 
because the record has found its way into an investigative file. 
Campbell v. Dep't of Health & Human Services, 682 F.2d 256,263 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
Federal case law shows that when an investigation is still ongoing, i.e. in Stage One (refer 
to Figure 1 above), the investigatory records typically are exempt from disclosure as long as the 
government can demonstrate interference with enforcement proceedings. Barney v. IR.S, 618 
F .2d 1268, 1270, 1273 (8th Cir. 1980) (Referring to the Robbins decision, the Eighth Circuit 
noted that the affidavits of the involved agents adequately demonstrated that production of the 
investigatory records would interfere with pending enforcement proceedings); see also Willard v. 
IR.S, 776 F.2d 100, 102-103 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding exempt from disclosure the IRS's 
investigatory record for a pending investigation); Lewis v. I.R.S, 823 F.2d 375, 377, 379 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (holding that investigatory records for ongoing investigation were exempt from 
disclosure; noting that the requestor's request for documents from an ongoing investigation 
alleviated the Court of having to conduct in camera review of documents in question); Campbell 
v. Dep't of Health & Human Services, 682 F.2d 256, 265 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (The D.C. Circuit 
Court required the government to demonstrate to the lower court how each document or category 
17 See Department of Justice, Guide to the Freedom of Infonnation Act: Exemption 7(A), pg. 540, fn. 47; pg. 541, 
fn. 50; pg. 551, fn. 70. <http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_guide09/exemption7a.pdf> 
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of documents would interfere with the investigation.); Crooker, 789 F.2d 64, 65, 67 (D.C. Cir. 
1986) (The D.C. Circuit Court required that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 
("BA TF") had to demonstrate how each withheld category of documents would interfere with 
the ongoing investigation); Bevis v. Dep't of State, 801 F.2d 1386, 1390 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(holding that the FBI did not provide enough information to the court for the court to be able to 
ascertain whether or not the release of the documents would interfere with enforcement 
proceedings) . 
In fact, federal case law even suggests that the investigatory record of a "dormant" 
investigation can also be exempt from disclosure. See Nat 'I Pub. Radio v. Bell, 431 F.Supp. 509, 
510-511, 514-515 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Where the D.C. Court considered the harm of potential 
criminals being able to learn about the government's investigation of their crimes before being 
brought to public justice, the Court determined that the records sought for were exempt from 
disclosure). 
Investigatory records of a case with pending enforcement proceedings, i.e. in Stage 
Three, are also exempt [rom disclosure. See Robbins, 437 U.S. 214, 214, 236, 98 S. Ct. 2311, 
2311, 2324, 57 L. Ed. 2d 159 (1978) (The United States Supreme Court specifically concluded 
that federal courts could determinate that, "with respect to particular kinds of enforcement 
proceedings, disclosure of particular kinds of investigatory records while a case is pending would 
generally 'interfere with enforcement proceedings.'" The Court ruled that "Exemption 7(A)'s 
language does not support an interpretation that determination of 'interference' under the 
Exemption can be made only on an individual, casc-by-case basis."); see also Title Guarantee 
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Co. v. NL.R.B., 534 F.2d 484,492 (2d Cir. 1976), Goodfriend W Corp. v. Fuchs, 535 F.2d 145, 
147 (1st Cir. 1976).18 
Federal case law provides grounds in certain situations to exempt from disclosure 
investigatory records with no pending proceedings, i.e. in Stage Four. Although the case at 
question in the Robbins decision had a pending proceeding, the Robbins Court noted that 
allowing prehearing disclosure of the records could have a chilling effect on the willingness of 
individuals in future investigations to report to the NLRB.19 437 U.S. 214, 241, 98 S. Ct. 2311, 
2326, 57 L. Ed. 2d 159 (1978). By being willing to construe "enforcement proceedings" as 
proceedings for cases other than the one in question, the United States Supreme Court sanctioned 
giving the exemption the broad reading that its language suggested. Based on this reasoning, in 
Marzen vs. u.s. Dep 'f of Health & Human Services, a federal district court granted investigatory 
records exemption from disclosure on the grounds that disclosure could interfere with future 
proceedings of other similar cases: 
Although language exists in the Court's opinion and in the legislative history both 
to support the plaintiffs argument that Exemption 7(A) is unavailable if no 
enforcement proceeding involving the documents in question is pending or 
contemplated and to support the government's contrary position, this Court finds 
the government's contention that Exemption 7(A) applies wlten tlte government 
can demonstrate specific and substantial harm to future enforcement 
proceedings to be more reasonable for several reasons. 
18 See Department of Justice, Guide to the Freedom of Information Act: Exemption 7(A), pg. 537. 
<http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_guide09/exemption7a.pdf> 
19The Robbins court stated as follows: 
Since the vast majority of the Board's unfair labor practice proceedings are resolved short of 
hearing, without any need to disclose witness statements, those currently giving statements to 
Board investigators can have some assurance that in most instances their statements will not be 
made public (at least until after the investigation and any adjUdication is complete). The possibility 
that a FOIA-induced change in the Board's prehearing discovery rules will have a chi11ing effect 
on the Board's sources cannot be ignored. 
437 U.S. 214, 241, 98 S. Ct. 2311, 2326, 57 L. Ed. 2d 159 (1978). 
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Indeed, the language of the Exemption refers to interference with "enforcement 
proceedings" in the plural, not to interference with the particular "enforcement 
proceeding" (in the singular) in question. This Court holds that Exemption 7(A) is 
broad enough to prohibit disclosure of law enforcement investigatory records 
whose release would interfere with enforcement proceedings, pending, 
contemplated, or in the future, so long as the governmental agency can 
demonstrate concrete, cognizable, and substantial interference with such 
proceedings. 
(Emphasis added.). 632 F. Supp. 785, 804 (N.D. Ill. 1986), affd sub nom., 825 F.2d 1148 (7th 
Cir. 1987); see also Harvey's Wagon Wheel, Inc. v. NL.R.B., 550 F.2d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 
1976) (holding similar records exempt for similar reasons to the Marzen court). 
Although federal case law does not directly determine whether investigatory records 
under prosecutorial review - i.e. in Stage Two - are exempt from disclosure, the existing case 
law suggests that these records are exempt. As detailed above, federal case law suggests that 
records in Stage One, Stage Two, and sometimes even in Stage Four are exempt from disclosure. 
Furthermore, the courts do not focus on whether the investigation is ongoing or merely pending a 
prosecutorial decision. 
Federal courts construing the Idaho PRA as currently written - FOIA's form from 1974 
to 1986 - would deny disclosure to Mr. Wade in this case. As demonstrated above, the courts 
have denied disclosure of such records when the investigation is pending. Furthermore~ the 
courts have denied disclosure of such records when a law enforcement proceeding is pending, or 
when such disclosure would discourage or inhibit future investigations. The courts even denied 
disclosure of some records, even after the end of enforcement proceedings for that case, in some 
instances. In this case, the CCP A has not yet made its charging decision, and may still need to 
conduct follow-up investigation. 
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The CCPA has satisfied the FOIA case law standards in showing interference with 
enforcement proceedings. As explained above, the CCP A does not need to justify exemption 
from disclosure on a document-by-document basis, but on a category-by-category basis. The 
CCP A explained how the premature disclosure of these records could taint testimony of other 
involved parties. 
In this case, the handling District Court Judge ("DJ") laid out an analysis apparently 
rooted in neither statutory definitions, nor in case law. Instead, the DJ embraced the notion that 
the statute required "certain" interference with enforcement proceedings regarding the Mr. Wade 
incident. The DJ did not explore any statutory definitions of "interference," the state or federal 
legislative history, or the wealth of federal case law on this topic. As demonstrated above, 
federal courts hold investigatory records exempt from disclosure often, whether enforcement 
proceedings are pending or not. The multiple federal analogues and the multiple methods of 
interference that the AG laid out in Wetzel were not part of the DJ's analysis. The subsequent 
amendments to the analogous federal statute, which now exempts from disclosure records that 
"could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings," also did not find their 
way into the DJ's decision. 
B. THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT IS NOT TO BE USED AS A WAY 
AROUND DISCOVERY. 
Prior to 2001, the Idaho courts allowed for a broad interpretation of the PRA and thus the 
Idaho State Legislature looked to provide protection to Idaho's governmental agencies. The first 
amendment to the Act came in 1986, in the form ofI.C. § 9-335. In 2001, the Idaho Legislature 
added an amended section I.C. § 9-343(3) to the act, which "curtails the use of the Public 
Records Act to 'supplement, augment, substitute or supplant ... ' the discovery process in criminal 
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and civil cases." 1. Dickinson, Public Records, 46-Aug Advocate (Idaho) 17, 18 (2003). The 
intent behind the Legislature found in its Statement of Purpose was "to underscore the 
Legislature'S intent that the Idaho Public Records Act was never intended for use as a discovery 
vehicle for civil, criminal or administrative litigation." 2001 Idaho Laws Ch. 101 (H.B. 151). 
The Legislature deliberately acted to stop litigants using the Act to circumvent normal discovery 
channels. By attempting to gather what he should obtain through discovery, in which he has,2o 
Mr. Wade is circumventing the proper legal procedures. 
The availability of records for administrative and judicial adjudicatory proceedings shall 
not be limited by the Idaho PRA. See o.A. G. opinion 95-6. The statute reads in part: 
Nothing contained in sections 9-337 through 9-348, Idaho Code, shall limit the 
availability of documents and records for discovery in the normal course of 
judicial or administrative adjudicatory proceedings, subject to the law and rules of 
evidence and of discovery governing such proceeding ... I.e. § 9-343(3) 
The Act expressly recognizes that the laws and rules of evidence and of discovery governing 
civil proceedings (i.e. the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure) dictate what evidence may be obtained 
for those proceedings, not the Idaho PRA. By compelling the Canyon County Prosecuting 
Attorney to disclose said documents, the District Court essentially holds that the Idaho PRA 
governs the issue rather than the rules established by the Idaho Supreme Court to govern 
discovery procedures. There is no authority for this proposition. 
When the Idaho State Legislature amended I.e. § 9-343(3) in 2001, the law was intended 
to underscore that the intent of the legislature was in that the Idaho PRA was "never intended for 
use as a discovery vehicle for civil, criminal, or administrative litigation." 2001 Idaho Laws Ch. 
20 According to counsel for the City of Fruitland, discovery including the police reports has been disclosed to Mr. 
Wade. 
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101 (H.B. 151).21 Idaho Code § 9-343(3) provides that certain sections of the Idaho Code, 
(including Section 9-335 which the State contends covers the particular documents in question), 
shall not "be available to supplement, augment, substitute or supplant discovery procedures in 
any other federal, civil or administrative proceeding." (Emphasis added.). The plain language of 
the statute provides that a public records request is not available to supplement or augment 
discovery proceedings pursuant to I.C. § 9-343(3). 
Rather, the legislature wanted parties to proceed through the proper rules of procedure 
and evidence to obtain discovery, whether in a civil, criminal, or administrative matter. In a civil 
case, the production of documents must follow the rules of discovery. I.R.C.P. 26. The 
appropriate method to obtain such records in a civil lawsuit (such as the tort action Mr. Wade has 
filed) is to comply with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In this case, Mr. Wade has made clear to the court and counsel that he wants the 
documents so he can pursue a civil tort claim against the Fruitland Police Department. On April 
19,2012 in Mr. Wade's Petition for Access to Public Records, the petition specifically indicates 
that Mr. Wade "must file a tort claim on/or before June 19, 2012 ... Mr. Wade seeks information 
in order to submit a claim that will provide sufficient notice to the government entity(ies) 
involved .... " (R., p. 4). Further, the petition goes on to state " ... Mr. Wade seeks these 
complicated investigations and/or reports because they contain information that will allow him to 
prepare a comprehensive tort claim." (R., p. 4). (Emphasis added.). The Legislature did not 
intend for the public records process to be used as Mr. Wade is attempting to in this case. 
21 Statement of purpose RS 10873 from the 2001 legislative session. 
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Through his public records request, Mr. Wade is trying to supplement discovery for his possible 
. . I 22 h' "1 23 cnmma case or IS CIVI case. 
As quoted earlier, the District Court noted in its Memorandum Decision on Petition for 
Access to Public Records that Mr. Wade's ability to pursue his tort claim would be hindered 
without full access. (R., p. 51). The District Court clearly deviates from the proper public 
records analysis and ignores the legislative intent of the statute. The District Court's decision 
centers around requiring disclosure of these documents in order for the Respondent to file a civil 
tort claim, bypassing the Civil Rules of Procedure, contrary to I.C. § 9-343(3) which curtails the 
use of the PRA to "supplement, augment, substitute or supplant ... " the discovery process in 
criminal and civil cases. The Legislature reaffirmed that the proper mechanisms for discovery 
are the criminal and civil rules of discovery rather than the PRA. By the District Court granting 
the Respondent's request, the court is defeating the very intent of the Idaho Legislature when it 
enacted I.C. § 9-343(3) by allowing Mr. Wade to use the Idaho PRA as a vehicle for discovery in 
civil litigation. 
C. MR. WADE IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
The district court issued its Memorandum Decision on June 29, 2012. The CCPA filed 
its notice of Appeal on July 11, 2012. On July 20, 2012, the District Court entered an Order to 
Stay Memorandum Decision pending appeal. On that same date, the Court also entered a Rule 
54(a) Judgment. The matter then came to this Court on appeal. On October 5, 2012, the District 
Court amended the Judgment to allow Mr. Wade to seek attorney's fees and costs "at the 
conclusion of Supreme Court No. 40142-2012." (Amended Judgment). Idaho Appellate Rule 
13.4 specifies when a district court may exercise jurisdiction over a case on appeal: 
22 As of the filing of this brief a decision on criminal charges has not been made. 
23 The Respondent has filed a civil lawsuit against the City of Fruitland and Officer Bill Copeland of the Fruitland 
Police Department in U.S. District Court ofIdaho on September 11 th, 2012. The case number is CV-465. 
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During a permissive appeal under Rule 12 I.A.R. or an appeal from a partial 
judgment certified as final under Rule 54(b) I.R.C.P., the Supreme Court may, by 
order, delegate jurisdiction to the district court to take specific actions and rule 
upon specific matters, which may include jurisdiction to conduct a trial of issues. 
A motion for an order under this rule may be filed with the Supreme Court by any 
party in the district court action or the administrative proceeding. 
I.A.R. 13.4. 
The District Court was without jurisdiction at the time it entered the amended judgment. 
The Judgment in this matter is final under Rule 54(a). Further, the parties did not seek leave of 
the Supreme Court for relief under Rule 13.4. The issue of costs and fees should therefore not be 
raised on appeal nor be allowed to be argued should this Court determine to remand the matter to 
the District Court. 
The District Court failed to follow the standards set forth under Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54 and supporting case law. 
[T]he district court must correctly perceive the award of attorney's fees is within 
its discretion and appropriately weigh the Rule 54( d)(l )(B) factors. 
Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536, 539, 224 PJd 1125, 1128 (2010). On September 20, 
2012, the court held a hearing on the motion to amend. At the hearing, the Court and Mr. 
Wade's counsel had the following exchange: 
Court: And as I see your request, it's basically attempt to preserve the issue of 
attorney's fees. 
Counsel: That's correct, Your Honor. 
Court: And I think that's well taken. I think that however, since the matter is on 
appeal, I think it would be more appropriate for the Court to consider the 
issue of attorney's fees subsequent to whatever result there is on appeal. 
Do you take issue with that? 
Counsel: No your Honor. That's basically what we are requesting. 
Court: Okay. 
Counsel: We just didn't have an opportunity because of the way Canyon County 
actually filed the appeal before they were supposed to, before judgment 
came out and you stayed it right away, so we didn't have a chance to 
actually do it. We would normally file a cross-motion in the appellate 
court for the issue of attorney fees, depending whether we receive it or 
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not. What we will do since it is on appeal, we will ask for attorney fees on 
appeal according to the rules. We want to preserve, we believe we win, I 
think we are going to be successful at the appellate court then we want to 
be able to preserve to come back in district court to in fact ask for attorney 
fees at that particular point in time. 
Court: And I agree. 
Counsel: So, if we can just get an order, that's all we wanted was an order to 
amend that judgment. 
Court: To reflect what? 
Counsel To reflect that we can, in fact, come back for attorney fees unless the 
court is just going to say yes, you will be able to come back for attorney 
fees. 
Court: I don't have a problem signing that order. 
As the above colloquy demonstrates, the District Court never recognizes the issue as one of 
discretion, and does not weigh the factors of Rule 54. The Court's failure to articulate any 
reason for granting fees is well taken, as the Court implicitly recognizes that it is without 
jurisdiction to hear the matter. Given the Court's lack of jurisdiction, and the lack of any 
analysis as to the merits of Petitioner's claim, the issue of attorney's fees at the District Court 
level should not be addressed on appeal. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the CCPA respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision of 
the District Court and hold that the investigatory records under review by a prosecuting attorney 
are exempt from disclosure under the Idaho PRA for the reasons set forth above. Disclosure of 
these records would interfere with law enforcement proceedings, deprive a person or the public 
of a right to a fair and/or impartial trial, and constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy as prohibited by the PRA. Furthermore, review of pertinent state and federal legislative 
history and cases clearly illustrates that records of this sort should be exempt from disclosure. 
Mr. Wade must use the proper discovery procedure available to him for his civil suit. 
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Therefore, the CCP A respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision of the 
District Court and offer guidance to similarly situated law enforcement agencies. 
DATED: February 2013. 
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BRYANF. TAYLOR 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
By: __ ~~====~~=====-_ 
Michael K. Porter 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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